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From the military mission viewpoint, the amount of research effort to be expended on the solutioti of a given aviation medicine problem must be keyed to the operational cost of the problem. Therefore, a necessary first step in the development of a solution is the assimilation of data that define the magnitude of the problem. Though orientationerror accidents involving pilot disorientation and vertigo have been long recognized to exist, little quantitative data are available to describe the actual incidence and cost of such accidents in Army aviation.
FINDINGS
To initiate the action necessary to establish the magnitude of the orientation-error problem in Army aviation, an interservice research program was organized under the joint sponsorship of the U. S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, the U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, and the Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory. The first step was the construction of an operational definition of an orientation-error accident. The assimilation of data pertaining to the incidence and cause of such accidents and their actual arid relative costs in terms of fatalities, injuries, and aircraft damage was then set as the working objective of the program. Accordingly, the decision was made to implement a five-year longitudinal study of all major and minor orientationerror accidents involving Regular Army flight operations beginning with fiscal year 1967. Findings are being summarized on a fiscal-year basis in three separate lines of reports: The first line is devoted to defining the over-all magnitude of the orientation-error problem in all aircraft types; the second line to the presentation of similar incidence and cost data for accidents involving only the UH-1 aircraft, the predominant rotary wing aircraft in the Army inventory; and the third line to the description of the various causal factors found to be present in the major UH-1 orientation-error accidents.
This specific report is the third in the series dealing with the over-all magnitude of the orientation-error problem in all aircraft types. Incidence and cost data are presented for all Regular Army major and minor orientation-error accidents detected in the search of the fiscal year 1969 accident files. Separate and totalized statistical data are provided for fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft as well as for accidents occurring in Vietnam and those occurring elsewhere.
The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
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INTRODUCTION
To investigate the operational role of pilot disorientation and vertigo in all orientation-error types of aircraft accidents, the authors have organized an interservice research program under the joint sponsorship of the U. S. Army Aeromedical Research Laborat^,ry (USAARL), the U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAAVS), and the Noval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (NAMRL). Since few quantified data were available to describe the actual magnitude of the orientation-error problem in Regular Army flight operations, the decision was made to conduct a five-year longitudinal study, beginning with fiscal year 1967, of all Army aircraft accidents that involved an erroneous judgment of aircraft'motion or attitude on the part of the pilot. Two separate, but related, project objectives were set for the longitudinal study. The first was to extract and assimilate data from the USAAAVS master aircraft-accident files which would define the actual and relative cost of orientation-error accidents to Regular Army flight operations. These data, by defining the operational magnitude of the problem, would then serve to define the extent of the research support which should be devoted to its solution. The second working objective was to extract data on a case-history basis which would describe the various pilot/aircraft/mission/environment factors found to be present in each of the orientation-error accidents. Assimilation and analysis of these data over the study period would result in better knowledge of the most common operational causes of orientation-error accidents and thus point out those research directions which offer the greatest potential toward the reduction of accident incidence.
The results of the longitudinal study are being summarized in three separate lines of reports, with one report in each line prepared for each fiscal year of the five-year study. The first line of reports (for example, ref. 1) is devoted to defining the incidence and cost of all major and minor orientation-error accidents involving all aircraft types, fixed wing as well as rotary wing, that occurred in Regular Army flight operations for each fiscal year. Since the UH-1 "Huey" helicopter has been, and is, the predominant aircraft in the Army rotary wing inventory, the second line of reports (for example, ref.
2) is devoted to defining the magnitude of the orientation-error accident problem in only this aircraft. The layout and format of this line of reports are almost identicul to those of the first line. The third line of reports (for example, ref.
3) deals exclusively with the various causal factors found to be present in all of the major UH-1 orientation-error accidents. Typical data to be presented include phase of flight, time of day, type of mission, pilot experience, physiological factors, psychological factors, facility factors, environmental factors, and the like. This specific report is the third in the series dealing with the magnitude of the orientation-error problem in all types of aircraft. Incidence and cost data are presented for all major and minor orientation-error accidents involving all Army Aviation flight operations, other than those of the Army National Guard or of Army Reserve activities, that occurred during fiscal year 1969. In addition, corresponding cost data are presented for all accident types, regardless of cause, and for pilot-error accident types so as to better establish the relative magnitude of the orientation-error problem. PROCEDURE A basic requirement for the commencement of this study was a workable definition of the class of accidents to be defined as involving orientation error. The reader is referred to previous reports (refs. 1-3) for a comprehensive definition and discussion of its rationale. Briefly, orientation is considered to involve the correct determination of the dynamic position and attitude of an aircraft in three-dimensional space. The key word here is dynamic, which implies that full knowledge of the motion as well as static attitude and position is required to define its instantaneous spatial orientation. Accordingly, a pilot is considered to have made an orientation error whenever his perception of the motion and attitude of his aircraft differs from the true motion or attitude; i.e., the true orientation of the aircraft. An orientation-error accident is then defined as one that occurs as a result of an incorrect control or power action taken by a pilot (or a correct action not taken) due to his incorrect perception of the true orientation of his aircraft.
With this definition of orientation-error accidents serving as a classification reference, an experienced classifier read all briefs in the USAAAVS master accident files and selected all major and minor accidents of this type occurring during fiscal year 1969. For redundancy, the entire accident files were also searched by sifting the coded summaries that USAAAVS prepares for each accident for a wide range of indicator terms.
The authors then reviewed the accident briefs independently for the purpose of establishing whether or not an orientation-error accident classification would result. In addition, the comprehensive master file on each suspect accident was obtained and reviewed. Whenever there was serious question as to the contribution of orientation error to the accident or where equally weighted alternative causal factors were present, then the accident was not included in the classification. The net effect of this policy is to give a conservative estimate of the magnitude of the orientation-error accident problem.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The reader is referred to the first report (ref. 1) of this series for details pertaining to the format selected to summarize the accident statistics on a fiscal year basis. Briefly, the format is keyed to providing a cursory review of the incidence and costs of aircraft accidents in general so as to place better perspective on the actual operational magnitude of the orientation-error accident problem. To establish this background, the first section to follow is devoted to describing the over-all cost of all Regular Army aircraft accidents, regardless of type or location, that occurred during fiscal year 1969. In a second section, equivalent data in a nearly identical format are presented to identify separately those accidents in the first section that were classified by USAAAVS as involving one or more pilot-error factors. Cost statistics pertaining to only orientationerror accidents are then presented in a third section. By using these three sets of data as independent references, it then becomes possible to establish some quantitative insight into the relative, as well as actual, cost of orientation-error accidents in Regular Army flight operations. Selected comparative relationships of this type are presented in the last section of the report.
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For convenience to the reader wishing to make a point-by-point comparison of the fiscal year 1969 accident statistics with the statistics for other fiscal years of the study, the layout and numbering of all tables and figures contained in this report follow identically those presented previously (refs. 1 and 4).
ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
The data presented in this section describe the incidence and cost of all major and minor aircraft accidents involving all Regular Army flight operations during fiscal year 1969. Separate data groupings are provided for accidents involving only fixed wing (FW) aircraft, only rotary wing (RW) aircraft, and their combined total. In addition, for each of these three statistical groupings, the data are divided into those accidents that occurred in Vietnam, those accidents that occurred elsewhere, and their combined total. Since the vast majority of the accidents that do not occur in Vietnam (VN) take place within the continental limits of the United States, the abbreviation US is arbitrarily used to denote all accidents which do not occur in Vietnam. It should be realized then that the US data grouping will include a small number of accidents that may have occurred, for example, in Europe, Africa, or elsewhere. A second point to be stressed is that the VN data pertain strictly to accidents, not losses due to enemy action.
In the interpretation of the accident statistics to follow, it becomes possible to compare FW and RW accident incidence or VN and US accident incidence only when some common measures of aircraft utilization are selected as weighting factors. To establish such comparative references, percent aircraft inventory, total flying hours, and total aircraft landings are used as basic weighting data in this report. These data, as well as the incidence and cost statistics presented in this section, are summarized in Tables I  through IV. Table I pertains to all accidents in all types of aircraft, Table II to only FW accidents, and Table III to only RW accidents. The ratio of the RW data in Table III to the FW data in Table H is summarized in Table IV. The aircraft inventory data listed in the fourth row of each of the tables indicate the following. First as shown by Table I , more aircraft operated out of US than out of VN. In relative terms 61.38 percent of the total FW and RW aircraft inventory were stationed in US as compared to only 38.62 percent in VN. The second poiht, derived from Tables II and III, is that RW aircraft remained the predominant aircraft in tho aircraft inventory. Of the total number of aircraft, 80.44 percent were of the RW type rind 19.56 percent of the FW type, thus resulting in a RW/FW inventory ratio of 4.11 to 1. For both types of aircraft, the VN/US inventory ratio was less than unity; i.e., 0.45 to 1 for FW and 0.68 to 1 for RW. Accordingly, in terms of average aircraft inventory, the majority of the aircraft operated in the US and the majority of the aircraft were of the RW type. This is in correspondence with the fiscal year 1967 (ref. The total aircraft flight hours data to be used as an accident weighting factor are plotted in Figure 1A for both aircraft types and for both geographical references. The visual interpretation of this graph, as well as the majority of the remaining graphs in the reports, is as follows: The group of three bars drawn at the left in Figure 1A pertain to the total flying hours of all FY aircraft. Within +his three-bar groujp, the right-hand bar, marked VN, plots the total number of FW hours flown in Vietnam; the left-hand bar, marked US, plots the total number of hours flown elsewhere (primarily in the United States); and the central bar of this group, marked ALL, is a plot of the direct sum of the adjacent VN and US data. The interpretation of the three-bar group drawn at the right ":n Figure ] A follows identically except that total hours of RW aircraft are involved. Similarly, the three-bar group at the center of the figure describes the total hours of both types of aircraftwith the depicted data representing the direct sum of the adjacent FW and RW data.
The data of Figure 1A and Table I show that Army aircraft were flown a total of 6,100,467 hours during fiscal year 1969,of which 3,281,832 hours were flown in VN and 2,818,635 hours elsewhere. This results in a VN/US total hours ratio of 1.16 to 1, indicating approximately equal usage in each location. The total hours data of Tables II  and III show that the VN/US total hours ratio was 0.92 to 1 for FW aircraft and 1.22 to I for RW aircraft. It should be observed also that the total number of hours flown in RW aircraft considerably exceeded those flown in FW aircraft. That is, the over-all RW/ FW total hours ratio was 4.74 to 1 (see Table IV ).
Weighting-factor data with total aircraft landings as reference are plotted in Figure lB . In terms of landings, the utilization of both FW and RW aircraft was greater in US; i.e., the VN/US total landings ratio was 0.44 to 1 for FW aircraft and 0.91 to 1 for RW aircraft. As would be expected, the total landings of RW aircraft exceeded those of FW aircraft, with the over-all RW/FW landing ratio being 11 .78 to 1.
With these aircraft utilization data serving as reference, it becomes possible to make a weighted interpretation of the raw accident data presented in Tables I through IV. The numerical incidence of all major and minor accidents, regardless of type or causal factor, is plotted in Figure 2 . The cost of these accidents,as measured by the total number of fatal accidents, number of fatalities, number of nonfatal injuries, and aircraft dollar damage, is outlined in Figures 3A through 3D , respectively. in terms of the over-all aircraft accident problem, these data show that during firCui year 1969, there were a total of 1,143 accidents, 169 of which were fatal; there resulted 521 fatalities, 1,217 nonfatal injuries, and $149,271,000 aircraft damage. The FW aircraft contribution to these totals was 110 accidents (15 of which were fatal), resulting in 32 fatalities, 65 nonfatal injuries, and $7, 180,000 aircraft damage. The RW data show 1,033 accidents (154 of which were fatal), resulting in 489 fatalities, 1,152 nonfatal injuries, and $142,091,000 aircraft damage. For FW aircraft, the VN incidence was 0.93 times the incidence elsewhere; for RW aircraft, the VN incidence was 3.61 times the incidence elsewhere.
The Table I data show also that the cost of these VN accidents was considerable in terms of personnel and aircraft. That is, there were 2.67 times as many fatal accidents in VN as there were elsewhere, 4.54 times as many fatalities, and 6.61 times as many nonfatal injuries. In addition, the average dollar damage of a VN accident was 1.86 8 In A, the three bars at the left pertain to fixed wing (FW) aircraftwith the VN bar indicating total FW hours flown in Vietnam; the US bar total hours flown elsewhere (primarily in the United States); and the ALL bar the sum of the adjacent VN/US data. The layout of the three bars at the extreme right is identical, but pertains to rotary wing (RW) aircraft hours. The three central bars summarize the FW and RW data and represent total hours of all aircraft types. Total RW hours were 4.74 times the total FW hours while total RW landings were 11 .78 times the total FW landings. Considering all aircraft, aircraft utilization in VN was about the same as that in US; i.e., the VN/US total hours ratio was 1.16 to 1 and the VN/US total landings ratio was 0.86 to 1. All Accident Types: Total number of major and minor aircraft accidents of all types that occurred in Regular Armyflight operations during fiscal year 1969. Total number of FW accidents is shown by the center bar at the left, with the adjacent VN and US bars indicating location of the accidents. Data for RW accidents are at the extreme right, with total accidents of both aircraft types summarized in the center. The VN data presented throughout this report pertain to aircraft accidents, not losses due to enemy action, that occurred ir Vietnam. Considering all aircraft, the incidence of accidents in VN was 3.07 times greater than the incid-ence elsewhere. All Accident Types: Normalized incidence data showing average number of accidents per 100,000 flying hours (A) and average number of accidents per 100,000 landings (B). For all FW aircraft, the rates were 10.36 and 7.58 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. For all RW aircraft, the rates were 20.50 and 6.04 accider-s per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. In all cases, the accident rates were greatest in VN. All Accident Types: Normalized ratio of accidents occurring in VN to accidents occurring in US based on equal flying houis (A) and equal landings (B) for both types of aircraft. Based on equal hours, the accident rates in VN for FW and RW aircraft were 1 .01 'and 2.95 times greater, respectively, than the US rates. Based on equal landings, the accident ,ntes in VN for FW and RW aircraft were 2.10 and 3.98 times greater, respectively, than the US rates. All Accident Types: Normalized ratio of accidents occurring in RW aircraft to accidents occurring in FW aircraft based on equal flying hours (A) and equal landings (B) for both locations. When equal hours served as a reference (A), the probability of an accident occurring in the US was about the same for both aircraft types. In VN, the RW accident rate was 2.80 times greater than the FW accident rate. When equal landings were used as a reference (B), the probability of an accident occurring in a RW aircraft was less than that for FW aircraft for either location.
times greater than the cost of a US accident. In terms of total dollar damage to the accident aircraft, the VN cost was 5.69 times the US cost. To facilitate the comparison of these fiscal year 1969 data with accident incidence data presented for other years of the study, the data sets in Figure 2 have been normalized relative to the total number of flyine hours flown by each type of aircraft in both locales and plotted in Figure 4A as the average number of accidents occurring every 100,000 hours. The same normalization with total landings as reference was accomplished for Figure 4B which shows the accident rate for every 100,000 landings. The VN/US ratio of these rate data for both aircraft types is plotted in Figure 5 . Considering only FW aircraft, the VN and US accident rates were almost identical when total hours served as reference. However, when total landings are considered,the FW accident rate in VN was 2.10 times greater than the US rate. For RW aircraft, the VN accident rate was considerably greater than the US rate for either weighting reference; i.e., the VN accident rate was 2.95 times the US rate based on hours and 3.98 times the US rate based on landings. For that fiscal year, the cost of the combat-oriented VN environment in terms of accident incidence was greater for RW aircraft.
To show the relationship between accident incidence in RW aircraft and that in FW aircraft, the ratio of the RW to FW accident rate data presented in Figure 5 is plotted for the two locations in Figure 6 . These data are also listed in Table IV . The RW/FW accident ratio for US operations, based on equal hours, was 0.96 to 1,indicating that the probability of an accident was about the same for either type aircraft. The same ratio for VN operations was 2.80 to 1, indicating a greater risk in RW aircraft. When landings are used as reference however, the RW/FW accident ratio drops to 0.44 to 1 for US operations and 0.84 to 1 for VN operations, indicating a greater risk in FW aircraft.
PILOT-ERROR ACCIDENTS
In this section, incidence and cost data are presented for all accidents that were classified by USAAAVS as involving one or more pilot-error causal factors. It should be observed that this classification does not imply that pilot error was the only, or even the primary, accident causal factor. That is, this grouping includes all accidents involving one or more pilot errors even though, for example, materiel failure, maintenance shortcomings, or poor facilities may also have contributed to the cause of the accident. A further point, by definition, is that these pilot-error accidents are a subgroup of the allaccident statistics discussed in the previous section.
Incidence and cost data for these fiscal year 1969 pilot-error accidents are presented in Tables V through VIII, with the Table V Pilot-Error Accident Types: Total number of major and minor accidents that were classified by USABAAR as involving one or more pilot-error factors. As with the Figure 2 "All Accident Type" incidence data, the number of pilot-error accidents occurring in RW aircraft operating out of VN considerably exceeded those occurring elsewhere. However, for FW aircraft, the number of pilot-error accidents that occurred in VN was slightly less than the US total. Considering all aircraft, the VN incidence was 2.65 times greater than the US incidence. Pilot-Error Accident Types: Total number of fatal accidents (A), total number of fatalities (B), total number of nonfatal injuries (C), and total dollar cost of resulting aircraft damage (D) for both aircraft types and for both locations. For RW aircraft, the loss was always greater in VN. Pilot-Error Accident Types: Normalized incidence data showing average number of pilot-error accidents per 100,000 flying hours (A) and average number of pilot-error accidents per 100,000 landings (B). These rate data are intended only as a fiscal year 1969 baseline reference for comparison with similar data calculated for other fiscal years of the longitudinal study. For FW aircraft, th, over-all rates were 7.34 and 5.37 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. For RW aircraft, the over-all rates were 12.37 and 3.64 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively.
Normalized accident rate data, based on the total hours and total landings data of Figure 1 , are plotted in Figure 9 . These rate data, as with the rate data of Figure 4 , are intended primarily as a baseline reference for comparison with similar data presented for other fiscal years of the study.
The incidence data of Figure 7 show that there were a total of 701 major and minor c "cidents involving pilot error; of this total, 100 were fatal accidents. The over-all cost was 346 fatalities, 741 nonfatal injuries, and $78,897,000 aircraft damage. The FW contribution to these totals was 78 accidents (9 of which were fatal), resulting in 19 fatalities, 52 nonfatal injuries, and $4,852,000 aircraft damage. For RW aircraft, there were 623 accidents (91 of which were fatal), resulting in 327 fatalities, 689 nonfatal injuries, and $74,045,000 aircraft damage. The VN/US accident incidence ratio was 0.86 to 1 for FW aircraft and 3.15 to 1 for RW aircraft.
As with the all-accident data, the cost cof RW pilot-error accidents in terms of personnel and aircraft damage was greater in VN. As calculated in Table VII and depicted in Figure 8 , there were 3.79 times more fatal RW accidents in VN :s there were elsewhere; there were also 8.62 times more fatalities and 7.94 times more nonfatal injuries. Furthermore, the average cost in dollars damage resulting from a VN accident was 2.38 times greater than the average cost of a US accident. In terms of total dollar damage, the cost in VN was 7.51 times greater than the cost in US. In general, for the FW piloterror accidents, the corresponding VN/US cost ratios were lower.
The pilot-error accident rate data presented in Figure 9 also establish the higher over-all cost of VN operations. For FW aircraft, the over-all accident rates were 7.34 and 5.37 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. The VN rate was 0.93 times the US rate based on equal hours and 1 .94 times the US rate based on equal landings. For RW aircraft, the over-all pilot-error rates were 12.37 and 3°64 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. The VN rate was 2.57 times the US rate based on hours and 3.48 times the US rate based on landings.
ORIENTATION-ERROR ACCIDENTS ONLY
This section summarizes the incidence and cost of all orientation-error type accidents detected in our review of the USAAAVS accident files. As detailed with selected qualifications in the procedure section of this report, this listing includes all accidents arising from an incorrect control or power action taken by a pilot due to his incorrect perception of the true motion or attitude of his aircraft. The reader should recocnize that the orientation-error accidents discussed herein are a subgroup of the pilot-error accident statistics presented in the previous section.
The main elements of the orientation-error statistics are summarized in Tables IX  through XII, with the Table IX data pertaining to accidents in all types of aircraft, the  Table X data to only FW accidents, the Table XI data to only RW accidents, and the  Table XII data describing the ratio of the RW to FW data presented in Tables XI and X, respectively. The pertinent incidence and cost data are outlined in Figures 10 and 11. Normalized accident rate data for these accidents are presented in Figure 12 for comparison of incidence in other fiscal years of the longitudinal study.
These data show that there were a total of 71 major and minor orientation-error accidents (22 of which were fatal), resulting in 51 fatalities, 79 nonfatal injuries, and $11,928,660 aircraft damage. The FW contribution was relatively smallinvolving a total of only 6 accidents (2 of which were fatal), resulting in 5 fatalities, one nonfatal injury, and a total dollar damage cost of $203,808. It is obvious that with such a low incidence (n) for fiscal year 1969 FW orientation-error accidents, conclusions to be drawn as to RW/FW or US/VN accident incidence and cost must await the acquisition of further FW data in this longitudinal study. For RW aircraft, there were a total of 65 major and minor orientation-error accidents (20 of which were fatal), resulting in 46 fatalities, 78 nonfatal injuries, and $11,724,852 aircraft damage. Thus the majority of the orientation-error accidents involving Regular Army aircraft occurred in RW aircraft in that fiscal year. As indicated by the RW data, the incidence and cost of accidents occirring in VN were both considerably greater than for accidents occurring elsewhere. This is particularly noticeable in the 9.00 to 1 VN/US fatal accident ratio, the 4.75 to I VN\,NUS fatality ratio, and the 14.60 to 1 VN/US nonfatal injury ratio.
The rate data in Figure 12 indicate that for FW aircraft, the over-all accident rates were 0.57 and 0.41 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively. For RW aircraft, the over-all rates were 1 .29 and 0.38 accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively.
COMPARATIVE INCIDENCE AND COST OF ORIENTATION-ERROR ACCIDENTS
The arrangement of the data presented in the previous sections was selected to differentiate the actual incidence and cost of all accidents, pilot-error accidents, and orientation-error accidents. In this section, selected incidence and cost data are expressed in percentage figures with the objective of gaining some insight into the relative contribution of orientation-error accidents to the over-all accident problem. In Figure 13 the percent incidence of fatal accidents is described for all accident types, pilot-error accident types, and orientation-error accident types. The Figure 13A data show that for FW aircraft, 13,64 percent of all FW accidents, regardless of accident cause or type, were fatal, with the incidence in VN 'Deing about 0.94 times greater than that in US. The RW data show that 14.91 percent of all RW accidents were fatal, with the VN incidence only 0.85 times the US incidence. In effect, considering all accidents, little difference exists in the percent incidence of fatal accidents relative to location for either type of aircraft. Considering both aircraft types together, the totalized data of Figure 13A show that 14.79 percent of all accidents were fatal.
The pilot-error accident data shown in Figure 13B indicate that the incidence of fatal accidents was 11.54 percent for FW aircraft, 14.61 percent for RW aircraft, and 14.27 percent for their combined sum. The VN/US fatal accident percent incidence ratio was 1 .20 to 1 for RW aircraft and 0.93 to 1 for FN aircraft.
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AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT Figure 10 Orientation-Error Accident Types: Total number of major and minor orientation-error accidents located in the search of the USABAAR master accident files for fiscal year 1969. Considering all aircraft, the incidence of orientation-error accidents in VN was 2.94 times the incidence of similar accidents elsewhere. Note that the low incidence of FW accidents restricts the interpretation of VN/US or RW/FW relationships for that fiscal year. Orientation-Error Accident Types: Total number of fatal accidents (A), total number of fatalities (B), total number of nonfatal injuries (C), and total dollar cost of resulting aircraft damage (D) for both aircraft types and for both locations. The reader is again alerted to the low n involved in the FW data. For RW aircraft, the loss was always greater in VN. Orientation-Error Accident Types: Normalized incidence data showing average number of orientation-error accidents per 100,000 flying hours (A), and per 100,000 landings (B). These rate data are intended only as a fiscal year 1969 baseline reference for comparison with similar data calculated for other fiscal years of the longitudinal study. For all aircraft types, the over-all rates were 1.16 and 0.38 orientation-error accidents per 100,000 hours and per 100,000 landings, respectively.
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ORIENTATION ERROR ACCIDENTS
For orientation-error accidents, however, the probability of a fatal accident was much higher, as shown in Figure 13C . Again, the reader is cautioned to remember the low incidence of FW accidents for this period. Since the only FW accident that occurred in VN was fatal, this accounts for the 100 percont datum drawn in dashed outline in Figure 13C . Thus for fiscal year 1969, the relative incidence and cost of orientationerror accidents derived predominantly from RW accidents. In the remaining orientationerror figures then, the "All Aircraft" data will, in essence, be identical to the "RW Aircraft" data. The percent incidence of fatal accidents when orientation error was involved was 35.85 percent in VN and 16.67 percent in US.
Similar comparisons for the three classes of accidents are made in Figure 14 for the average number of fatalities per fatal accident. In this case, for all aircraft, the cost of orientation-error accidents was less than that calculated for the other two classes of accidents. Furthermore, the orientation-error accident cost in US exceeded that occurring in VN,which is in contradistinction to the all-accident and pilot-error accident data for all aircraft types. The same format is used in Figure 15 to depict the average number of nonfatal injuries that occurred per accident. The all aircraft data indicate a more or less comparable cost for all three accident classifications. However, for orientation-error accidents, the VN/US ratio was considerably greater than that of the other two accident classifications. In terms of the average dollar damage per accident data presented in Figure 16 , orientation-error accidents resulted in the greatest loss.
Figures 17 through 20 illustrate the relative contribution of orientation-error accidents in all aircraft types to selected incidence and cost data as a given percentage of corresponding statistics for both "all accident types" and "pilot-error accident types." In Figure 17 , orientation-error accidents can be seen to represent 6.21 percent of all accidents that occurred during fiscal year 1969 and 10.13 percent of all pilot-error accidents. When one considers the number of fatal accidents that occurred in the two accident groups, as is done in Figure 18 , orientation-error fatal accidents represent 13.02 percent of all fatal accidents and 22.00 percent of all fatal pilot-error accidents. In terms of fatalities, orientation-error accidents resulted in 9.79 percent of the total number and in 14.74 percent of those occurring in pilot-error accidents, as indicated in Figure 19 . Lastly, orientation-error accidents accounted for over 7.99 percent of the total dollar cost of all accidents and 15.12 percent of the total dollar cost of all piloterror accidents, as shown in Figure 20 .
At this time, no attempt will be made to discuss further these findings or to draw any conclusions as to their over-all significance. Since corresponding data are under preparation for subsequent fiscal years, the full significance of the fiscal year 1969 data will depend upon whether this longitudinal analysis does or does not establish consistencies or trends in the accident experiences. Moreover, it is the function of this element of the longitudinal study only to provide quantitative data; the actual evaluation of the accident in terms of effect on the military mission must remain with those responsible for the direction of military aviation operations. 
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AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT Figure 13 Comparative incidence of fatal accidents expressed as the percent of the total number of accidents within the "All Accident Type" (A), "Pilot-Error Accident Type" (B), and "Orientation-Error Accident Type" (C) classifications that resulted in one or more fatalities. Note that orientationerror accidents had a significantly higher percentage of fatal accidents. Average number of fatalities per fatal accident occurring within the "All Accident Type" (A), "Pilot-Error Accident Type" (B), and "Orientation-Error Accident Type" (C) classifications. Average number of nonfatal injuries per accident occurring within the "All Accident Type" (A), "Pilot-Error Accident Type" (B), and "Orientation-Error Accident Type" (C) classifications. Average aircraft dollar damage per accident occurring within the "All Accident Type" (A), "Pilot-Error Accident Type" (B), and "Orientation-Error Accident Type" (C) classifications. The average cost was greatest for orientation-error accidents. Percent contribution of all orientation-error accidents to the total number of accidents occurring within the "All Accident Type" and the "Pilot-Error Accident Type" classifications. Considering all types of aiicraft, ogientation-error accidents accounted for 6.21 percent of all accidents and 10.13 percent of all pilot-error accidents. 
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-ALL TYPES --PILOT-ERROR- Figure 18 Percent contribution of all fatal orientation-error accidents to the total number of fatal accidents occurring within the "All Accident Type" and the "Pilot-Error Accident Type" classifications. Orientation-error accidents accounted for 13.02 percent of all fatal accidents and 22.00 percent of all fatal pilot-error accidents. Percent contribution of all orientation-error accident fatalities to the total number of fatalities occurring within the "All Accident Type" and the "Pilot-Error Accident Type" classifications. Orientation-error accidents accounted for 9.79 percent of the total number of fatalities and 14.74 percent of the fatalities due to pilot-error accidents. Percent contribution of the dollar cost of all orientation-error accidents to the total cost of all accidents occurring within the "All Accident Type" and "Pilot-Error Accident Type" classifications. Orientation-error accidents accounted for 7.99 percent of the total cost of all accidents and 15.12 percent of the cost of all pilot-error accidents,
